The Journal of Geoeconomics is dedicated to the analysis of the use of economic means for power-political purposes. The Journal publishes both original research and policy-oriented insights. The aim of the Journal of Geoeconomics is to provide a timely outlet for empirical findings and insights regarding the increasing use of economic instruments for purposes of security, influence, coercion, and strategic competition. While the Journal's central focus is on understanding and documenting the behaviour of states, contributions analysing the responses and strategies of non-state actors, notably corporations, are also welcome. The Journal welcomes a wide range of disciplinary and methodological approaches, from econometric analyses to qualitative case studies. Uniquely, the Journal aims to be a pioneer in developing new types of publications aimed at generating value for both academic and policy communities of interest. To that end, the Journal also publishes short-form Case Studies, Data Insights, Exercises & Simulations, and Foresight Analyses. The Journal also publishes long-form Policy Reports. This category is aimed at facilitating the transformation of long-form research reports (e.g. as produced in the context of research projects) into peer-reviewed publications. The Journal of Geoeconomics is an open-access, peer-reviewed journal published by Geoeconomics Press, an independent Canadian publisher that supports the generation and dissemination of research and analysis in geoeconomics. The views expressed are those of the authors. ISSN 3111-2684
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. It may be used, shared, distributed, and reproduced in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The license deed is available at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
This Publisher’s Note introduces the Journal of Geoeconomics and situates its launch within the growing need for rigorous, peer-reviewed scholarship on the strategic use of economic power. It sets out the Journal’s mission to advance open access research and analysis in geoeconomics, reflects on the development of the Journal and its inaugural volume, and underscores the importance of building scholarly infrastructure for an empirical and cumulative field of knowledge. It concludes by acknowledging the editors, authors, reviewers, advisers, colleagues, institutions, and wider community whose support, engagement, and encouragement have informed the Journal’s development and inaugural volume.
Copyright (c) 2026 D. Matthew Millar (Author) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Countering China’s Economic Coercion: Lessons from Japan
Over the past two decades, China has shown a growing willingness and capacity to use its formidable economic clout to coerce countries toward its geopolitical aims. Beijing’s coercive approach today is evolving—from mainly leveraging its large market and targeting smaller nations to deploying its export power against large economies—changes that demand a reevaluation and refinement of countermeasures to deter China’s coercion. This paper explores Japan’s response to China’s 2010 rare earth elements (REE) export restrictions as an empirical case of the efficacy of deterrence by denial, and derives lessons and recommendations for U.S. policymakers.
Copyright (c) 2026 Matthew P. Goodman, Andrew Huang, Madeline Burns https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Towards an Economic Security Alliance: The Architecture of Collective Resilience in the Age of Geoeconomics
Liberal democracies face mounting geoeconomic threats and economic coercion, yet no structured common framework exists to address them. This Policy Proposal calls for a pragmatic Economic Security Alliance (ESA) between like-minded countries to enhance collective resilience and manage interdependence strategically. Rather than a rigid treaty-based model, the ESA would coordinate pragmatically across priority policy areas such as export controls, investment screening, critical raw materials, cybersecurity, and emerging technologies, under a rotating secretariat. The proposal advocates a phased Track 1.5 approach, led by trusted experts, to develop a blueprint for later adoption. The resulting ESA would safeguard economic openness and liberal democracy and deter those seeking to undermine them.
Copyright (c) 2026 Fabian Zuleeg (Author) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Beyond the Radar: Economic Coercion, Narrative Warfare, and the China–South Korea THAAD Dispute
In 2016, South Korea’s decision to deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system prompted a coordinated campaign of informal economic coercion by China. Although Beijing denied any official retaliation, regulators shuttered Lotte retail stores, state-backed media amplified consumer boycotts, and the China National Tourism Administration quietly ordered a halt to group tours to South Korea. This case study reconstructs the timeline of coercive actions using primary sources including tourism data, corporate disclosures, and government statements. It assesses China’s use of informal tools—regulatory harassment, cultural sanctions, and market-based pressure—to signal displeasure while maintaining plausible deniability. The paper also considers South Korea’s countermeasures and policy responses, including WTO consultations and the “Three No’s” policy. While China inflicted tangible economic costs, especially in the tourism and retail sectors, it ultimately failed to reverse the THAAD deployment. The case illustrates both the capabilities and limitations of informal geoeconomic coercion in regional security disputes. JEL Classification: F51, F52, F59, H56
Copyright (c) 2026 Jonathan Walberg (Author) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Coercion Without Concession: Australia’s Response to China’s Trade Coercion, 2020–2024
In April 2020, Australia’s public call for an independent investigation into COVID-19’s origins prompted Beijing to launch its most comprehensive campaign of economic coercion against a developed economy in recent years. Through a mix of formal trade remedies and informal import restrictions, China targeted key Australian exports—barley, wine, coal, seafood, timber—while avoiding iron ore. Drawing on WTO filings, trade statistics, and official statements, this case study reconstructs the sequence, logic, and outcomes of the coercion, highlighting sectoral economic damage, political resilience, and implications for allied strategies against state-led trade coercion. JEL Classification: F13, F51, F52, Q17, O24
China’s Anti-Dumping Investigation on Pork Imports From Europe: A Calibrated Retaliation
This case study explores China’s ongoing retaliation against the EU through an anti-dumping investigation of EU pork, after the EU conducted an anti-subsidy investigation into Chinese-produced electric vehicles (EVs). China’s pork probe aimed to sway key EU Council votes on EV tariffs, targeting Spain as the largest pork exporter—especially of offal, which is difficult to export elsewhere. Furthermore, China considered Spain particularly vulnerable to its influence because of its ambition to receive investment from China into green technology sectors, including EV and battery factories. We find this case instructive, as a continuation of China’s policy to pit the economic interests of EU Member States against one another, with negative consequences for the EU’s overall leverage. A policy recommendation to be drawn from this case study is for the EU to build internal protection against Member States playing against EU-level interests in trade and investment.
Copyright (c) 2026 Alicia García-Herrero, Théo Storella https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
How to Withstand China’s Economic Coercion: The Case of China’s Economic Pressure Campaign Against Australia, 2020–2024
From 2020 to 2022, China imposed restrictions on Australian imports after Canberra’s inquiry into the origins of COVID-19 and a ban on Huawei’s 5G network. Canberra was able to resist the pressure campaign by rerouting exports to new markets. However, as a compromise, Australia suspended its barley and wine cases against China in the WTO. Using publicly available sources, this case study examines trade restrictions China imposed on Australia in 2020–2022 as well as their gradual easing in 2023–2024, analyzes Beijing’s motivations and objectives, and explains lessons learned for other smaller economies with high trade dependence on China.
Copyright (c) 2026 Maia Nikoladze (Author) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Economic Coercion as Foreign Policy Signalling: China’s Punitive Measures Against France, 2008–2009
This case study examines China’s use of informal economic coercion against France during the 2008 Tibet crisis. Drawing on official Chinese statements, trade data, and bilateral agreements, the case study traces events from March 2008 to late 2009 and highlights Beijing’s efforts to enforce political red lines while presenting its actions as a defensive response. Measures included suspending diplomatic engagements, consumer boycotts targeting French companies, and stalled commercial deals. Framed in terms of national sovereignty, these measures illustrate how China leverages trade, market access, and nationalist sentiment to punish target states and deter similar actions by others.
Copyright (c) 2026 Maria Papageorgiou, Panagiotis Palaios (Author) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
When Drones Become Targets: China’s Economic Coercion Against Skydio
In October 2024, China designated Skydio and its CEO under the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL) in retaliation for U.S. approval of defense assistance to Taiwan. Although Skydio manufactures dual-use drones, it denied providing technology to Taiwan’s Defense Ministry, claiming it was targeted because it had raised national security concerns about U.S. purchases of Chinese-made drones. Skydio’s exposure to PRC supply chains made it particularly vulnerable. Following sanctions, Skydio’s valuation fell sharply, it was forced to raise additional funds, and it began a new publicity campaign highlighting new defense-related contracts. Despite U.S. government support for domestic battery manufacturing, Chinese measures continue to affect Skydio’s access to battery technology and pending PRC measures could impact other U.S. drone manufacturers’ production. Sanctions on Skydio suggest PRC officials are now willing to use new legal tools to both send signals and impose costs when strategic industries are involved. JEL Classification: F13, F51, F52, L52, O33
Copyright (c) 2026 Jim Mullinax (Author) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Pressure and Preparation: Japan’s Response to Chinese Rare Earth Coercion and Lessons for U.S. Policymakers
U.S. policymakers face enduring dependencies on Chinese critical mineral supplies, with vulnerabilities exacerbated by Beijing's control over global processing and its willingness to weaponize its leverage for political goals. To support U.S. policymakers as they confront Chinese export controls on rare earth elements (REEs), this case study examines lessons from the 2010 Senkaku Islands dispute when China halted REE exports to Japan and the United States. The conventional narrative of the dispute fundamentally mischaracterizes both Chinese actions and Japanese responses, focusing on Japan's immediate crisis responses. However, closer examination reveals that Japanese policymakers and industry worked for years to reduce vulnerability to Chinese supply manipulation, offering lessons about the importance of sustained supply chain investments, industry-led resilience, and strategic partnerships. Finally, this case study also conveys new insights about the Chinese coercive strategy. JEL Classification: F13, F51, F52, L52, Q34
Copyright (c) 2026 Taylore Roth, John VerWey (Author) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
China’s Economic Retaliation Against Norway After Liu Xiaobo’s 2010 Nobel Peace Prize
This case study analyzes China's geoeconomic retaliation against Norway after the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Liu Xiaobo. China employed non-tariff barriers, diplomatic freezes, and restricted exchanges, severely impacting sectors like salmon exports. This occurred despite the Nobel Committee's independence from the Norwegian government. Although Norway's overall economic impact was mitigated by market adjustments, the six-year diplomatic freeze significantly influenced its human rights foreign policy. This case exemplifies China's strategic use of informal economic tools to punish and deter, showcasing the link between political sensitivities and economic leverage in international relations. JEL Classification: F51, F13, F14, F50
Copyright (c) 2026 Ian Murphy, Dr. Shaomin Li (Author) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Trade Sanctions with no Trade: China’s Weaponization of Value Chains Against Lithuania
In late 2021 Lithuania came under trade sanctions from China in a crescendo of tensions that culminated with allegations of a violation of China’s One China Principle. As the bilateral relationship is very small, China blocked all trade – direct and indirect – originating from Lithuania, weaponizing inbound value chains. In the aftermath, Lithuania’s direct exports to China dropped by nearly 70%, and indirect exports – embedded in third countries’ shipments and more difficult to control – by over 10%. Analysis of selected benchmarks suggests that the drop is unrelated to broader economic trends. Despite their economic impact, China’s sanctions have so far failed to change Lithuania’s course. This episode represents a significant escalation in the logic of weaponized interdependence and a demonstration of China’s evolving capacity to exploit it. JEL classification: F13, F14, F51, F52, C67
Copyright (c) 2026 Michele Savini Zangrandi, Michele Mancini (Author) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Fit for War by 2030? European Rearmament Efforts Vis-à-Vis Russia
This research article presents new data on military procurement in Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), Poland, and France, and uses these data to analyse procurement patterns, delivery timelines, and force-generation constraints against the background of a deteriorating security situation and rising Russian capabilities. We show that procurement has substantially increased since 2022 with Germany and Poland focusing on land forces, while the UK’s spending is focused on maritime forces. However, we show that procurement needs to accelerate and be frontloaded to be prepared for a possible Russian attack assessed to occur as early as 2030, as delivery delays of three years or more persist. Military strategy and technology are evolving rapidly, particularly with the growing role of unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, and multi-domain integration. Military planners must modernise weapons and strategy while simultaneously scaling existing and effective systems. We show that sustained investment in European technology is essential for modernisation. European weapons tend to be expensive due to low production volumes in a fragmented market, and a focus on cost-effectiveness is vital to ensure the EU’s planned €800 billion defence spending is sufficient and fiscally sustainable.
Copyright (c) 2026 Alexandr Burilkov, Katelyn Bushnell, Juan Mejino-López, Thomas Morgan, Guntram Wolff (Author) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Asset Restrictions on Springboarding amid China–US Geoeconomic Competition
The catch-up strategy of springboarding has been widely adopted by emerging market firms seeking to internationalize. Successful springboarding requires access to sophisticated assets, often only available in more developed economies. The recent growth of geoeconomic measures, particularly between the United States and China, is impeding this process. As the two economies have moved from economic complementarity to hegemonic competition, restrictions on access to resources have increased in both number and scope. We examine the impact of growing restrictions and alternative means to access desired technologies. Market restrictions on scarce assets encourage strategies of domestically-focused and supported path-creation when building capabilities for successful internationalization. JEL Classification: F23, F51, F52, O33, O34
Copyright (c) 2026 Peter Enderwick (Author) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
The Evolving Beijing Consensus: Chinese Communist Party Political Control and Economic Trade-offs
China’s rapid economic rise and unique development trajectory have long been the subject of scholarly debate, often framed through the concept of the “Beijing Consensus” as an alternative to the Washington Consensus. While initial conceptualizations highlight innovation, sustainability, and national sovereignty, later analyses highlighted elements like state capitalism and authoritarianism, particularly in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. This paper argues that the Beijing Consensus is undergoing a significant evolution under Chairman Xi Jinping, increasingly prioritizing the Chinese Communist Party’s political security, regime stability, and ideological control at the expense of economic growth. This marks a notable departure from earlier pragmatic, growth-oriented policies. To substantiate these claims, the article examines three case studies: China’s economic response to the 2008 Financial Crisis, the implementation of the Zero-COVID policy (2020–2022), and the regulatory crackdown on the technology sector from 2020 onward. By analyzing the trade-offs between political imperatives and economic optimization in these instances, the paper demonstrates a consistent pattern in which political control takes precedence. These findings reorient the understanding of the Beijing Consensus and underscore the central role of the CCP’s drive for political control in shaping China’s development model, carrying significant implications for its future economic trajectory and global engagement. JEL Classification: H12, O25, O53, P16, P51
Copyright (c) 2026 Ian Murphy (Author) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Is Russia Getting Paid for its Exports? New Evidence on the Impact of Economic Sanctions
Since the beginning of the conflict, Russia has accumulated an unprecedented amount of trade credits against the rest of the world. We argue that this is linked to the effect of economic sanctions, as restriction to payment networks limit Russia’s exporters ability to receive foreign exchange payments for their exports. This previously undocumented effect of sanctions may help explain (within the context of other sanctions and economic developments) the recent bouts of volatility in the ruble exchange rate. JEL Classification: F31, F32, F34, F51
Copyright (c) 2026 Emidio Cocozza, Michele Savini Zangrandi (Author) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Between Sanctions and Subsidies: Geoeconomic Lessons from the Semiconductor Ecosystem
Semiconductors have become the quintessential strategic industry of the twenty-first century, sitting at the crossroads of economic competitiveness and national security. In recent years, major powers have deployed a mix of coercive and supportive measures that are transforming the sector’s geography. On one side, export controls and investment screening seek to deny adversaries access to critical technologies; on the other, industrial policies aim to secure supplies and sustain technological leadership. This paper maps these concurrent policies across leading economies and interprets them through a geoeconomic lens – as instruments designed to shift the global distribution of capabilities. By linking denial and inducement strategies within a unified analytical framework, it highlights how the semiconductor race exemplifies the broader tension between economic interdependence and national security in the global order.
Copyright (c) 2026 Michele Savini Zangrandi, Lilia Patrignani, Alessandro Schiavone https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0